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This paper uses census and survey data to identify the wage earning ability and the selectivity of recent
Romanian migrants and returnees. We construct measures of selection across skill groups and estimate
the average and the skills-specific premium for migration and return for three typical destinations of
Romanian migrants after 1990. We find evidence for a sorting of migrants consistent with skill compensation
in destination countries. The premium to return migration increases with migrants' skills and drives
the positive selection of returnees. Based on the rationality of these migration decisions, a model of
education, migration and return predicts positive long-run effects of increased migration for average
skills and wages in Romania.
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D.Radu@psi.org.uk1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The emigration of the most productive workers, attracted by higher wages abroad, has often been regarded as
harmful for developing countries (Gruber and Scott 1966; Bhagwati 1976; Bhagwati and Hamada 1974; Bhagwati
and Rodriguez 1975). However, from the perspective of migrants themselves, migration is an opportunity to
improve, sometimes dramatically, their standard of living. There is evidence that migrants e.g. from Latin
America (Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett 2008), from India (De Coulon and Wadsworth 2010) or from
Eastern Europe (Budnik 2009) earn on average two to three times more at destination than they would at
home. Moreover, the migration of highly skilled may induce virtuous educational incentives in the native
population. In the long run, this might increase the overall human capital of the sending country. "Brain gain"
has been identiﬁed as a theoretical possibility1 and recent empirical research has looked for evidence of it in the
data. Beine et al. (2001, 2008) use a cross-country approach to show that low emigration rates are positively
correlated with average schooling levels. Using individual data, Batista et al. (2007) and Chand and Clemens
(2008) ﬁnd a positive incentive eﬀect of skilled emigration on education. In addition to this, a large body of work
has shown migration tends to be temporary rather than permanent and return migrants often become successful
entrepreneurs or return with highly productive skills. The positive impacts of return migration for the countries
of origin have been analyzed theoretically by Dustmann (1995), Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003), Mayer and Peri
(2009), Dustman, Fadlon and Wiess (2010) and Dustmann and Glitz (2011), among others. There is extensive
evidence that return migrants receive income premia for their work experience abroad (Reinhold and Thom
2009; Barret and Goggin 2010). Several recent studies have also emphasized the importance of returnees as a
source of entrepreneurship (Constant and Massey 2002; McCormick and Wahba 2001).2
These aspects of migration and return are particularly relevant for the case of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE). After the opening of the borders in 1990 and subsequently in the context of EU-enlargement, several of
its professionals as well as unskilled workers moved to Western Europe and to North America (see e.g. Kahanec
and Zimmermann 2009 for a recent overview). Over the last two decades, return migrants also became an
important and fast-growing group on the labour markets in all CEE (for a recent overview see e.g. Martin and
Radu 2011). Precise and comparable ﬁgures of the stock of East European migrants who already returned to
their countries of origin are still missing. However, some recent research suggests that these migrants acquire
productive skills while abroad and receive signiﬁcant income premia upon return (see e.g. Co, Gang and Yun
2000 for female return migrants in Hungary; De Coulon and Piracha 2005 for Albanian returnees; Hazans 2008
for Latvian returnees and Iara 2009, Martin and Radu 2011 for cross-country comparisons). There is also
evidence that returnees in CEE have a higher propensity for entrepreneurial activities or for self-employment
1For instance in the papers by Stark et al. (1997), (1998), Mountford (1997), and Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001).
2Returnees have been sources of start-ups in high-tech sectors in countries such as India (Commander et al. 2008) and in the
Hsinchu Science Park in Taipei (Luo and Wang 2002). Zucker and Darby (2007) ﬁnd that in the period 1981-2004 there was a
strong tendency of "star scientists" in several ﬁelds in the US to return to their country of origin and promote the start-up of
high-tech ﬁrms (especially in China, Taiwan and Brazil).
2than non-migrants (Kilic et al. 2009; Piracha and Vadean 2010), but are at the same time more likely not to
participate on the labour market.
The consequences of migration and return on the sending countries will depend crucially on two aspects: the
size and the selection of these ﬂows. The larger the number of migrants and returnees the larger are the potentials
for gains and losses. Moreover, for the countries of origin, a positive selection of migrants and returnees, in terms
of their skills, may represent both a challenge (risk of brain drain) and an opportunity (incentives for learning
and improvement of skills). Given the lowering barriers to international mobility from CEE, will increased
mobility of Eastern Europeans result in harmful consequences for their countries of origin? How does migration
and return contribute to the productivity and income of workers? What will be the consequences of further
reducing the cost of migration?
The aim of our paper is to quantify the size and selection of migration and return for the case of a repres-
entative CEE country and to characterize the potential consequences of international mobility for its levels of
wages and productive skills.
Our empirical analysis will focus on migration from Romania. This is a particularly relevant case due to
the size of the population, but also the structure and destination of labour outﬂows and the considerable rate
of return migration, which are average among CEE countries.
Using a unique combination of census and large survey data we are able to identify Romanian migrants in
three main destination countries (Spain, Austria and the US) and to match this information with micro-data
on non-migrants and returnees in Romania. We use census data (2000-2001) from these destination countries
as well as data from the EU-Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for Austria and Spain, and
from the National Demographic Survey (NDS) of Romania (2003). These data provide a picture of the relative
size and relative characteristics (including wages) of the cross-section (circa 2002) of individuals from Romania
who are non-migrants, returnees, migrants to the US, Austria or Spain. These three countries were typical
destination countries for Romanian and other CEE migrants but also span very well the diﬀerent ranges of
institutions and labor market types across which CEE migrants sorted after 1990.
Our results suggest that migration choices are responsive to economic incentives as workers in speciﬁc skill
cells migrate in larger shares to countries which pay higher wage premia for those skill cells. We observe that
migrants to the US are positively selected because the wage premium of migrating to the US is much higher
for the high skill-cells (in terms of wage earning ability). To the contrary migrants to Spain are more likely
to come from low-skill cells as the wage premium of migrating to Spain is larger for low skills cells. Austria
exhibits a migration premium neutral to skill level. This rationality of migration is consistent with other ﬁndings
for CEE migrants (e.g. Budnik 2009). Romanian returnees are positively selected and this also supports the
other ﬁnding of higher return premium for highly skilled. Given our data we can only identify selection on
observable characteristics, and we refer to the literature to argue how selection on unobserved characteristics,
though unlikely to reverse any of them, may aﬀect the results.
3The rationality of migration and the positive selection of returnees allows us to evaluate the aggregate (skill
and wage) eﬀects of migration for Romania. In order to quantify these eﬀects, we use the estimated returnee
premium and the observed scale of return-migration in a model of schooling, migration and return, developed
previously by Mayr and Peri (2009). We adapt the parameters to the case of Romania to obtain the long-run
impact of increased mobility, accounting both for return migration and for indirect eﬀects from incentives on
schooling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts and aggregate statistics
on migration and return for CEE and Romania. Section 3 describes our data and the measures of average
selection and average premium we construct. Section 4 presents our estimates for selection and return premia.
Section 5 shows empirical evidence of the relation between migration frequency and premia across skill groups.
Section 6 uses some of our estimates and summary statistics in a model simulating the skill and wage eﬀect of
relaxing migration constraints for Romania. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Stylized facts of East European Migration
2 . 1 S t o c k so fM i g r a n t sa n dR e t u r n e e s
Prima facie evidence on migration and return can be obtained from population censuses (or current population
surveys). For years around 2000 such data have been organized by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) into widely
used data set. For a selected group of receiving OECD countries, the United Nations (2009) has also collected
long time series on yearly gross inﬂows of migrants by country of origin.
Although these data are fraught with various methodological problems, they provide a ﬁrst take on the
magnitude of migration from and return to Eastern Europe. We consider the years 1990 and 2000 for a group
of 14 Eastern European countries that can be identiﬁed consistently. Table 1 shows the stock of emigrants to
all OECD countries from each of these Eastern European countries, as shares of their domestic population.
As expected, every single country increased, sometimes very signiﬁcantly, the share of its migrant population
abroad. Around the year 2000 these shares varied between 3-4% in large countries (e.g. Poland and Romania)
and 17-19% in smaller countries (e.g. Albania and Macedonia).
For a subset of these Eastern European sending countries and a subset of OECD receiving countries we
can also impute the return migrants as share of the gross ﬂows. We use the data on stocks from Docquier and
Marfouk (2006) to obtain (by diﬀerence) the net immigration country by country between 1990 and 2000. From
the United Nation (2009) data on yearly gross ﬂows from the same countries of origin to the same destinations
we obtain the cumulative gross ﬂows of migrants (1991-2000). The diﬀerence between gross ﬂows (from country
 to ) and the net changes of people from country  living in country  constitutes a measure of re-migration3.
3We ignore the mortality of migrants.
4Following Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and Dustmann and Weiss (2007) we assume that all of these re-migrants
are returnees and we count this diﬀerence as the measure of imputed returnees. We summarize the results in
Table 2 and 3 by aggregating gross and imputed return ﬂows by source and host country (respectively). Table
2 is most useful for understanding the import of return migration in a period that experienced large gross
migration from Eastern Europe. Three features are worth of notice.
First, and most importantly, for all countries of origin and destination the imputed return migration is a
substantial share of total gross migration ﬂows. The ratio of returnees to gross migrants can be larger than 1
since not only migrants who arrived in this decade but also earlier migrants returned during this period. Table
1 shows that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland experienced return migration close or even larger than their
gross emigration ﬂows. This is an expected ﬁnding since these countries have a longer history of migration
before 1989 and might experience now a "retirement migration" of migrants who left around 1968. However,
all other East European countries have return rates between 0.3 and 0.6. This suggests a substantial role of
return migration on the labour market in countries of origin. Second, the summary statistics by destination
countries (Table 3) show that most countries display rates of return migration to Eastern Europe which are
considerable (for Australia and France exceptionally high) but consistent with previous reports of the retention
rates of migrants in OECD destinations (OECD 2008, part III). Third, Table 2 also shows that Romania is an
average East-European country with regard to the rate of return migration relative to gross ﬂows. The median
return rate for the considered countries is 1.12 returnees per 2 migrants, while for Romania it is slightly below
1 returnee per 2 migrants.
These aggregate ﬁgures have to be interpreted with caution. They may be biased if, for instance, undoc-
u m e n t e dm i g r a n t sa r eb e t t e rc o u n t e di nc e n s u sd a t at h a ni nt h eo ﬃcial entry statistics, or if the deﬁnition of
immigrants (by nationality, place of birth or country of last residence) is not consistent between census and
administrative data. Despite such measurement problems we can certainly conclude that return migration is
not a marginal phenomenon for East European countries. We can safely say that a substantial fraction of
migrants eventually return to their home country. Assuming the return rate was not decreasing in the decades
before 2000, between 30 and 60% of emigrants from Eastern Europe eventually return to their home country.
To grasp the likely impact of this migration on the home labour markets it is important to understand the ra-
tionality of migrants and returnees. There are extremely diverse reasons for return migration, ranging from the
completion of a studies abroad or the termination of ﬁxed term temporary contracts to improved opportunities
at home. However, we aim to characterize the skills of migrants and returnees to determine if the behavior
of Romanian migrants is consistent with economic rationality in which changing labor market opportunities
produce incentives for migration.
52.2 Romanian Migration Patterns in the early 2000s
In the period immediately after the regime change and the opening of the borders in 1989, migration from
Romania was ﬁrst characterized by mass permanent emigration of ethnic minorities (German and Hungarian).
However, by the mid 1990s a new pattern of labour migration to various European and overseas destinations
emerged. Labour outﬂows increased steadily against the background of a slow pace of economic restructuring
which resulted in a large decline in GDP, high inﬂation, mass layoﬀs, decreasing real wages and rising unemploy-
ment (Earle and Pauna 1996, 1998). Deindustrialization led to a decrease of industrial employment by almost
3 million jobs and aﬀected both younger and older workers, who, because they lacked skills or did not have the
incentive to acquire new skills, were less likely to ﬁnd new employment opportunities (Voicu, 2002).
During the period 1994-2000, while overall ﬂows were still rising, the destinations of Romanian migrants
became more settled. With regard to the selectivity of the migration ﬂows from Romania, these destination
countries could be grouped into three main categories (EIR 2003, Diminescu and Lazaroiu 2002, Radu 2003,
Baldwin-Edwards 2007). First, positive selection was observed for migration ﬂows to more traditional immigra-
tion countries (US, Canada, Australia). These ﬂows were rather small but persistent and included a signiﬁcant
share of young people who migrate for educational purposes (Diminescu 2003). In the early 2000s the US was
one of the main countries from where migrants returned and settled back in Romania (OECD 2008). A second
group of destination countries were characterized by a neutral average selectivity of migration from Romania
often determined by a polarization of migration ﬂows towards the lower and the upper ends of the skill distri-
bution. These were the continental European countries which, despite a “Fortress Europe” migration policy,
received most of the East European migrants over the 1990s: Germany, Austria and France (Sandu et al. 2006;
Diminescu 2003). Third, particularly towards the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s large ﬂows of Romanian
migrants arrived in Mediterranean countries, mainly in Spain and Italy, but also, to a lesser extent, in Portugal
and Greece (Sandu et al. 2006, Diminescu and Lazaroiu 2002). These ﬂows were characterized by negative
selection: most migrants were lower skilled, tended to have a longer migration history, often involving informal
or illegal employment spells, and made use of network ties established in their communities of origin (Elrick
and Ciobanu 2009; ¸ Serban and Voicu 2010).
This pattern of migration consolidated in the period 1994-2001. After that, the Schengen visa restrictions
were lifted for Romanian citizens. The numbers continued to rise, particularly to the Southern European
destinations, but qualitatively the pattern remained the same (Sandu et al. 2006).
For the period 2002-2003 we can construct a measure of the stock of Romanian migrants in OECD countries
and a measure of returnees, both as shares of the total population in Romania. Moreover, we can also characterize
the distribution of migrants residing in OECD countries (using data from Docquier and Marfouk 2006) and of
returnees (using microdata from the NDS 2003) by education. These data are summarized in Table 4 and
conﬁrm that the group of returnees as of 2003 was slightly larger than the group of Romanians abroad as of
62001. This supports stylized statistics presented above suggesting that more than 60% of Romanian migrants
eventually returned. The data in Table 4 suggests both migrants and returnees are positively selected over the
education variable, relative to the total population. The share of returnees is smallest in the group of people
with no degree (and for migrants among those with primary education) while it is largest among those with
tertiary education (similarly for migrants). The selection of migrants seems even more skewed towards highly
educated relative to returnees. However, these aggregate data hide the already mentioned considerable variation
in the selection patterns across destination countries. Nevertheless, even these problematic aggregate statistics
reinforce the described migration pattern. The main countries of residence for Romanian migrants according
to these data are listed in Table 5. Since it reports the stock of migrants over a longer period of time, the
list includes the North American destinations (US and Canada) along with the more recent destinations like
Germany, Italy, Spain and Austria.
The main goal of our paper is to analyze the rationality of decisions to migrate and return with regard to
the observed selectivity patterns and the sorting of Romanian migrants across these destinations. Using unique
sources of data we are able to identify Romanian migrants in three of the main destination countries: the US,
Spain and Austria. These countries span very well the type of destination countries for Romanian migrants,
each of them corresponding to one of the three selection patterns described above. The US belongs to the
group of countries receiving positively selected migrant from Romania, being an Anglo-Saxon country with high
returns to skills and relatively unregulated labor markets. Austria is a continental-European country (similar
to Germany) with more regulation in the labor markets, lower skill compensation, restrictive immigration
policies and it receives, on average, neutrally selected Romanian migrants. Spain (along with Italy) received a
large number of negatively selected Romanian migrants and has a rather regulated labor market, with a high
concentration of unskilled jobs in construction and manufacturing and thus low skill premia. Our analysis based
on individual data will characterize the features of selection for both migrants and returnees. It will relate
these to skill-speciﬁc premia in order to test if economic rationality is consistent with the observed selection and
sorting of Romanian migrants across destinations.
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
Following the literature on selection of migrants (e.g. Hanson and Chiquiar 2003, Fernandez-Huertas Moraga
2008) we ﬁrst characterize the distribution of non-migrants, migrants to diﬀerent countries and returnees based
on their combination of observable characteristics. We group individuals into cells to estimate their wage-earning
ability and their probability of employment (in Romania). We call the wage-earning ability, the skill of that
group of workers. For each cell, we count non-migrants, returnees and migrants to US, Austria and Spain to
determine how these groups compare to each other in their distribution across skills. We deﬁne the selection of
migrants (positive or negative) as the diﬀerence in average skills between migrants and non-migrants. We assess
7then if the likelihood of selecting oneself into a group (non-migrants, migrants or returnees) is systematically
related to skills.
Our data include wages by each skill cell, both for Romanian migrants (in the US, Austria and Spain) and for
non-migrants and returnees (in Romania). We can therefore calculate the average and the skill-speciﬁcp r e m i u m
to migrate and to return. Using a simple regression analysis (by skill), we can relate the probability (frequency)
of migration/return to the corresponding skill speciﬁc premium. Controlling for the costs of migration (that may
diﬀer by skill) allows us to test the economic rationality of migration and return. This is a simple modiﬁcation
of the Roy (1951) model to measure selection in many skill groups and to estimate the migration premia with
diﬀerent selection rules, for returnees and permanent migrants.
We describe the individual data and their skill structure in section 3.1. Section 3.2 discusses in detail the
measures of average selection on observables. The construction of the average and skill-speciﬁc migration and
return premium is described in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents then the model we use in our econometric
analysis of the determinants of selection.
3.1 Individual Data and Wage Decomposition
We match information from census data (for employment) and population surveys (for wages) to analyze the
characteristics of three groups of Romanian workers around the year 2003: non-migrants, migrants and returnees.
The data for Romania are from the National Demographic Survey (NDS 2003), as well as from the Census
2002. The NDS data were collected by the Center for Regional and Urban Sociology (CURS) and were designed
to be representative both at national and regional level. Our restricted sample has more than 35,000 obser-
vations, including 1,400 returnees (who had spells of employment abroad), and covers all relevant individual
characteristics besides information on migration choices4. We use census and income surveys for the three
destination countries. For the US, we construct employment, population and average monthly wage data on
Romanian migrants by observable characteristics using the 2000 Census. For Spain, we use the 2002 Census for
employment and population data on Romanian immigrants and the EU-SILC (2004) for average monthly wage
data. For Austria, we use the 2001 Census for employment and population data on Romanian immigrants and
the EU-SILC (2004) for the average monthly wage data. We convert all wages into 2003 US $ and we consider
that database as a cross section of Romanian individuals circa 2003, either resident in Romania (non movers or
returnees) or resident in USA, Austria or Spain. We restrict our sample to individuals between 15 and 65 years
of age.
In the constructed data set we observe for each individual  a vector of characteristics  and his migration
status, i.e. non-migrant in Romania (), migrant residing in a destination country  (), or returnee ()i n
Romania after an employment spell abroad. Following Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), the vector  includes four
4The dataset is described in greater detail in Epstein and Radu (2007).
8relevant characteristics deﬁned by the following categorical variables: education (), with the categories No
Degree, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary; age () taking ten values from 15 to 65 in 5 years intervals; gender
(), with the two categories  and ; and family-size () with four categories: Single with no children,
Married with no children, Single with Children and married with Children. These characteristics identify the
observable features of an individual in our dataset. We use the notation  =(    ) ∈ 
to denote the vector of characteristics of individual . We allow for the fully saturated model in observable
characteristics, so individuals can be put in one of 320 cells spanned by  (= 4 education by 10 age by 2
gender by 4 family groups). Each individual has also a "migration status"  attached to herself as she can be
a non-migrant in Romania, a migrant residing in country  (USA, Spain or Austria) or a returnee, hence 
∈ {  }Our dataset also allows us to actually observe (for Romania and USA) or to
impute (for Spain and Austria) based on their occupation and industry, the wage of each individual 
5.
We decompose the log wage of individual  working in country  into four components as follows:
ln()=l n()+l n()+( = ) ∗ ln()+ (1)
The term ln() is the mapping from individual observable characteristics  into log wages in Romania
in 2003. Assuming that the observable characteristics  are the main determinants of wage-earning abilities
of individuals, the function ln() translates the characteristics into a wage earning potential in Romania.
The term ln() is the migration premium (or "location" premium as deﬁned by Clemens, Montenegro and
Pritchett 2008). It represents the extra wage (in log points) obtained by individual  from working in country 
as migrant The reference country, Romania, will be identiﬁed as  =0and we set, by deﬁnition, ln0()=0 .
We allow this premium to vary with individual characteristics across skill groups. The term ln() is the
"return" premium. It is the premium (positive or negative) from being a returnee ( = ) relative to being
an o n - m i g r a n t s. Finally,  are the idiosyncratic eﬀects on the earning abilities of individual  in country ,
which we ﬁrst assume to have zero-mean in each cell  of the set  a n dt ob eu n c o r r e l a t e dw i t h, (|)=0 
Unobservable wage-earning characteristics of individuals within an observable skill-cell  are thus assumed to
be independent and identically distributed with zero average. However, later we will discuss the possibility of
non-random unobservable characteristics and its implications on selection issues.
5As we do not observe individual wages in the Spanish and Austrian census (and the EI-SILC is too small to have representative
wages for Romanian migrants in Austria and Spain), we attribute the average wage based on occupation-industry (from the
respective population surveys). The basic idea is that observable characteristics aﬀect the type of occupation-industry in which
a person works and the wage is determined by those attributes. In the rest of the paper we will call individual wages the wages
constructed following this procedure for Austria and Spain residents. For residents of Romania and US we have the actual individual
wages.
93.2 Measures of selection
Our goal is to deﬁne and measure two sets of concepts that are crucial to characterize the process of temporary or
permanent migration and to elucidate the connections between these concepts. The ﬁrst set of concepts are the
selection of migrants (relative to non-migrants) and the selection of returnees (relative to non-migrants) along
the wage-earning ability (skill) dimension. Are migrants (and returnees) selected, on average, among individuals
with higher earning abilities (positive selection) or lower earning abilities (negative selection) than the average
non-migrants? Given the structure of our data we will be able to characterize the selection of migrants only
along the observable wage-earning abilities. This is necessary due to the absence of good instruments but also
follows the advice given in Hartog and Winkelmann (2003) against correcting for selectivity when the sample
of migrants is small relative to the sample of non-migrants. We will however discuss, in light of the existing
literature, what may be the selection of migrants along unobservable skills and how it may aﬀect our ﬁndings.
As for returnees, we will need an identifying assumption to distinguish selection on unobservables from the
return premium. The second concept to be measured is the "premium" from making a migration decision;
in particular the premium for being a "migrant" and for being a "returnee". In any economically motivated
theory of migration, for a given set of observable characteristics, migrants to a richer country should earn more
than non-migrants. However, how does this premium vary with skills and country of destination? Even more
interesting would be to know if, for given observable skills, returnees earn more or less than non-migrants. If
there is a premium for returnees, then temporary migration has a permanent positive eﬀect on earning abilities.
Hence migration and return can be part of a strategy to increase the living standards and returnees are not, on
average, those who made a mistake in the initial decision to migrate. Like for the migration premium, it is also
very relevant to understand whether and how the return premium depends on skills.
Let us deﬁne, in turn the formulas to obtain each of these terms: the average selection of migrants and
returnees on observables and the average premium for migrants and returnees, as well as their dependence on
observable skill.
3.2.1 Average Selection
The average (logarithmic) wage-earning ability of a non-migrant () with observable characteristics  call
it ln b () is summarized by the average individual wage of all non-migrant individuals in observable cell .
Hence ln b ()=( 1 )
X
∈
ln where  is the observed total employment in cell  The variable
ln b () can be called (wage-earning) skill of group . The average observed skill of the non-migrants in Romania








 is the observed relative frequency of non-migrant workers,  in cell  If,






with a large enough sample, such as the census, the value ln b () calculated from the sample would converge
to ln(). In order to identify how migrants compare to non-migrants in their observable skills, we construct
the counter-factual wage distribution based on the observable characteristics of migrants and the corresponding
observed wage of non-migrants for each cell .I np a r t i c u l a rw ed e ﬁne the average skills of migrants to country








 is the relative frequency of migrants to country , observed from the
census of country  This method accounts in a fully non-parametric way for the fact that migrants are non-
randomly selected from the original population and uses the relative frequencies of migrants to non-migrants to
correct for this. Moreover, the diﬀerences in skills between migrants and non-migrants are evaluated at home
wages, assigning each skill its Romanian price.
Similarly, to identify how returnees to Romania compare to non-migrants we construct the average wage-





ln b ()() (4)
Analogous to (3) the term ()=
X
∈
 is the relative frequency of returnees in skill cell .G i v e n
the deﬁnitions provided above, we deﬁne the average "selection"() b a s e do no b s e r v a b l e s( )o fm i g r a n t st o
country , relative to non-migrants as:
 =l n0 − ln0 (5)
If expression 5 is positive, migrants to country  are selected on average above the mean of wage-earning
characteristics of non-migrants. This is positive selection. Vice-versa, if it is negative, migrants to country 
are selected, on average, below the average wage-earning ability of non-migrants. They are negatively selected.
Moreover, as the expression is in log diﬀerences, it approximates the diﬀerence in wage earning abilities as
percentage of the average non-migrant wage. Similarly, we deﬁne the selection of returnees (on observables)
relative to non-migrants as:
 =l n0 − ln0 (6)
Like above, a value of   0 implies a positive selection of returnees relative to people who did not
migrate.
11There are two issues that may bias the selection of migrants and returnees according to observable char-
acteristics, produced by 5-6. Those biases may produce the appearance of positive or negative selection when
t h e r ei sn o n eo rv i c ev e r s a . T h eﬁrst issue is that for given observable characteristics participation rates into
employment in Romania may be systematically diﬀerent from participation in the labor market of country 
The second is that there may be unobserved characteristics correlated with the  (hence not random and not
zero-mean within group ) and those may diﬀer between migrants and non-migrants. We will discuss them in
turn.
3.2.2 Participation into employment and unobservable characteristics
The rate of participation into employment for a group with characteristics  can be diﬀerent at home and abroad.
It is easy to think that if a skill group  is paid a higher wage in a country this may attract workers of that skill
group to that country and push a larger fraction of them to work. This may aﬀect the calculated skill selection,
if we base our evaluation of formulas 5 to 6 on employment data. For instance, if migrants to country  have
characteristics that are identical to non-migrants but, once in the labor market of country , their participation
to employment is relatively larger in the high wage-potential groups compared to their participation in Romania,
the method above will produce the appearance of positive selection, when there is in fact no selection. Had
those migrants stayed in Romania, they would have earned, on average, as much as non-migrants. To avoid
this problem, we should correct the relative frequency of migrants in constructing their average wage earning
ability ln0 In particular, rather than the frequency of characteristic  in employment we should use its
frequency in the population of migrants and correct those population frequencies by the participation rates of
each group  in Romania. Such correction allows us to compare the average wage-earning ability of migrants,
had they stayed in Romania, with that of non movers. Formally we can deﬁne the "participation-corrected"





















 is the total population (rather than workers only)
with characteristic  w h om i g r a t e dt oc o u n t r y, while 
0
 is the employment-population ratio for workers
of characteristic  in Romania (
0
 =  
 ) We will use the empirical participation rate of non-
migrants in each cell from the Romanian Census 2002, as non parametric estimate of 
0
,a n dt h ed a t ao nt h e
population 
 of migrants in group  in country  from the Census of country  The "double selection"
into migration and into employment that is considered in many recent papers (e.g. Chiquiar and Hanson 2005,
Fernandez-Huerta Moraga 2008, Piracha and Vadean 2009) is addressed here in a completely non-parametric
way. Assuming that we have identiﬁed the relevant observable characteristics that determine the probability of
migrating and of participating into the labor force, we use a fully non-parametric relation between those and the
12migration probability, and between those and participation at home, to identify the selection on wage-earning





0 − ln0 (8)
identiﬁes the diﬀerence in wage-earning ability of migrants had they remained at home relative to the wage-
earning abilities of non-migrants. This is the cleanest comparison possible to identify the type of migrant
selection on observable wage-earning abilities. Similarly, we can correct the skill selection of returnees by
imputing to them the employment-population ratio of non-migrants.
3.2.3 Unobservable characteristics
The unobservable individual characteristics denoted as  in expression 1 have been assumed to be uncorrelated
with  so that (|)=0  However, it is possible that some unobservable characteristics are correlated with
 so that (|)=() For instance if unobserved wage-earning abilities are larger, on average, for groups
with larger observable wage earning ability then () can be systematically positively correlated with ln()
Under these circumstances the term (1)
X
∈
does not converge in probability to 0 and hence cannot be
approximated to 0 using the Census sample. In fact, if diﬀerent selection processes operate on the unobservable
characteristics it may even be possible that: (

 |)=() 6= (
 |)=() which means the
conditional average of unobservable wage earning ability for a group  is diﬀerent between migrants and non-
migrants.
This departure from the original assumptions implies that the total average skill selection indicator 
will equal:
 =  +  = (9)
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()() is capturing the selection of migrants over
the unobserved wage earning abilities. The term  cannot be constructed with our data. To do this
one would need information on the wage paid to migrants in Romania, before they migrated. Some recent
studies on Mexican data (Fernandez Huertas-Moraga 2008, Kaestner and Malamud 2010) have used data on
pre-migration wages and have evaluated such a term for Mexican migrants. Clemens et al (2008) also evaluate
this for the Philippines, South Africa and Mexico. These are countries not too far from the income level of
Romania, hence we can look at the average selection of migrants on unobservable skills there, especially relative
to selection on observables, to gather an idea of how large that phenomenon could be. While it is hard to have
13a clear theoretical expectation on the sign and magnitude of the selection on unobservables, two considerations
may help.
Why should migration costs or migration selection by the receiving country be strongly related to some
unobserved abilities? First, while in some speciﬁc cases certain skills might aﬀect migration behavior (e.g.
knowing one speciﬁc language), it is hard to see how these are systematically correlated with observables
and, in the aggregate population, this may not matter much. Second, if we consider an economic rationale
for migrating, the type of selection produced on observables should be the same (positive or negative) as
on unobservables. A country that rewards wage-earning skills would attract more skilled workers along the
observable and unobservable dimension. In accordance with this intuition most of the existing estimates of
observable and unobservable selection either ﬁnd no relevant selection on unobservables (Kaestner and Malamud
2010) or ﬁnd selection on unobservable of the same sign and smaller scale than selection on observables (Budnik
2009, Fernandez Huertas-Moraga 2008 and the relevant cases in Clemens et al 2008).
3.3 Income premia and selectivity patterns of migration
A similar non parametric method can be used to identify, under some assumptions, the average premia, both
for migrants and for returnees. Consider the counter-factual wage (4) that returnees would earn if they were
paid as non-migrants, with the same characteristic  and diﬀerence between this and their actual average wage.
This diﬀerence represents exactly the average premium to returnees (call it ” 0”) plus a term representing










=  0 + 
The term ln() (from the decomposition of individual wages in expression 1) is the "return" premium for
being a returnee and may depend on  On the other hand, if returnees diﬀer systematically on unobservables
from non-migrants then there would be an extra term  capturing the selection on unobservables.
Assuming unobservable wage earning skills of returnees relative to natives are independent of ,t h e n =
0 so that the expression above deﬁnes  0
Finally, we can compute the wage premium that the average migrant to country  will receive relative to what
she would have earned at home. This is the "migration" or "location" premium, i.e. the fact that the receiving
country pays more for given observable characteristics than the home country Romania. The average premium
to migrate to country  (plus the selection on unobserved characteristics) is calculated using the observable










  + 
Notice that the term ln() is the wage earned in country  by Romanian immigrants of skill .U s i n g
the individual wage deﬁnition in 1, the diﬀerence in the wage of an individual with characteristic  earned at
home, 0, or abroad, , is the sum of the individual location premium, ln() weighted by the frequency of
Romanian migrants to country  plus the unobserved selection of migrants to country   Given the
lack of information on  we will consider it as relatively small, vis-a-vis   so that we can neglect
it and the expression 11 identiﬁes the average migration premium.
3.4 Skill Premium and Skill-Selection
Section 3.3 deﬁnes some aggregate statistics to characterize the selection and the premium for migrants and
returnees. Being based on the partition of the population into cells  ∈  this method deﬁnes also the
selection and the premium for each value . Even more conveniently, as the function ln b () transforms the
multidimensional set of characteristics  into a unidimensional skill, ln, we can invert the mapping (−1(ln))
and deﬁne selection and premia for each level of the skill variable ln6 In particular, using the notation
introduced in section 3.3 the selection of migrants relative to non-migrants is measured as a function of the wage
level by the relative density: (−1(ln))(−1(ln)) For instance, a value of this relative frequency
for a cell equal to 1.3 implies that in this cell people are 30% more likely to migrate relative to staying, than
in the average cell. A value of 1 implies that in the cell people have the average probability of migrating
to . Similarly, the selection of returnees relative to non-migrant over the skill spectrum ln is given by:
(−1(ln))(−1(ln)) The logarithmic premium for migrants at each level of skill can be written as:
 (−1(ln)) = ln()−ln() and similarly 0(−1(ln)) = ln()−ln() where the
wage diﬀerences are taken for workers of same skill 
The representation of selection (relative frequency) as a function of skills is helpful to illustrate the whole
proﬁle (kernel distribution) of each group (non-migrants, migrants and returnees). Similarly, the characterization
of the premia as a function of skills, ln, allows us to analyze more systematically how they are related.
In a very simple theory of migration, however, it is also useful to consider each skill cell  ∈  as an obser-
vation on a group of workers (whose number is equal to population in the cell) who have speciﬁc characteristics.
Assuming each group as having a random distribution of migration costs to each country and a common return
from migration to country  which is given by the common linear premium ()=() − ()
6Such an inversion require the the mapping to be one to one. While, in theory several cells could map to a single wage, in
practice as the wage valuse are continuous each cell maps only to one wage value satisfying the requirement.
15under general assumption on the distribution of costs the odds of migrating to that country relative to non
migrating are an increasing function of the linear premium. Allowing for a measurement error () in the
relative frequencies, this can be approximated by the following linear relation:
()()=()+ ∗ ()+() for  ∈  (12)
The relative selection in group  indicates by how much the migrants are over (1) or under (1) represented
in that skill group relative to non-migrants. Two qualiﬁcations are needed. First, under the assumption of
idiosyncratic costs distributed as an extreme value Gumbull distribution, the standard utility maximization in
the Logit model implies that there is a linear relation between log odds and wage diﬀerentials (see for instance
Ortega and Peri, 2009). Expression 12 is simply a linear approximation of that exact equation Second, the
coeﬃcient  captures whether the selection, consistent with utility maximization, is increasing in the linear
returns to migration. The term () introduces the possibility that the selection is aﬀected also by migration
costs that are systematically diﬀerent by skill group. Regression 12 will be estimated for each country of
emigration to see if the implication that 0 derived from a model of rational migration, is supported in
the data. In testing the equation for each country of emigration we are assuming independence from irrelevant
alternatives. Similarly, as we have an independent measure of return premium, ()=() − ()
for each skill group, we can test whether the data support a theory of return motivated by economic beneﬁts.
We will run the regression:
()()=()+ ∗ ()+() for  ∈  (13)
and test for 0 People need not return to a wage equal to that of similar non-migrants. In this
perspective migration and return can be the optimal choice, even with no uncertainty (or unexpected shocks)
for some people, as we will see in section 6.
4 Evidence on Selection and Premia
To analyze the evidence on selection and premia for Romanian individuals in year 2003,we ﬁrst show some
simple graphs of selection for migrants and returnees over education and age. We will then present the values
of the average skill selection on observables as well as the whole distribution of skills for migrants and returnees
relative to non-migrants. Finally, we will show the average migration and return premium and their distribution
by skill for migrants and returnees
164.1 Simple selection on Education and Age
Figure 1 and 2 present aggregate evidence on the selection of returnees and migrants to each of the three
destination countries over education and age groups. Each panel of Figure 1 shows the distribution of non-
migrants and one other group (in turn returnees and migrants) in the form of histograms over four education
groups (no degree, primary, secondary and tertiary). The wider bars represent the distribution of non-migrants,
always the comparison group, and the thinner bars the distribution of the other group. Figure 2 does the same
for the distribution across age groups. Panel 1 reports the comparison with returnees, Panel 2 with migrants to
the US, Panel 3 with migrants to Austria and Panel 4 with migrants to Spain. In each panel the distribution,
which is relative to working individuals (male and female), has been constructed using census data. Some
tendencies are already clear from these ﬁgures and anticipate some of the regularities that we will unveil later.
First, returnees are clearly positively selected among education groups vis-a-vis non-migrants. Their relative
distribution is much more skewed towards workers with tertiary education at the expenses of workers in any
other education group. In terms of age, returnees are much less diﬀerentiated from non-migrants, however tend
to be slightly over-represented among groups with intermediate and old age rather than among young workers
(below 25). Migrants to the US tend to be better educated as well as older relative to non-movers. Both features
may add to their earning abilities. The largest share of migrants to the US is among workers with secondary
schooling and above, and they are signiﬁcantly over-represented among workers older than 50. Migrants to
Austria seem the group with the more "average" selection relative to non movers. Their education distribution
is not very diﬀerent from that of non-movers (except for a slightly larger share of secondary educated and a
smaller share of those with no degree). The age distribution is only slightly more concentrated in the group 30
to 50 relative to non-migrants. Finally, migrants to Spain show a clear "negative" selection, being much more
concentrated than non-migrants among workers with only a primary degree (across education groups) and in
the groups of less than 30 years of age (among age groups).
To summarize, the observable feature of returnees look similar to that of migrants to the US, the group
of returnees showing the strongest educational distribution. Migrants to Austria, on the other hand, are the
most similar to non movers and they show a concentration in intermediate education and age groups. Finally,
migrants to Spain seem the group with lowest earning potential skills as they are concentrated among low
education and young age groups. We will test more formally in the next section whether these stylized facts
match the more carefully constructed measures of average selection.
4.2 Selection on observable wage-earning skills
Table 6 shows the values of the average skill selection of returnees and migrants to the US, Austria and Spain
relative to non-migrants. The entries in Column (1) of Table 6 are (respectively from the ﬁrst to the last row)
the statistics , , ,  deﬁn e da si ns e c t i o n3 . 2 . I nc o l u m n( 1 )w e
17construct the frequencies for the group of non-migrants () using the Census 2002 data. In column (2) we
evaluate the same statistics when the frequencies () are measured using the NDS 2003. Column (3) shows
the average selection statistics obtained when we correct for participation in the destination country using the
observed participation in Romania. Column (4) shows the statistics obtained using only employment and wages
of male workers. Column (5) removes from the Romanian sample the ethnic minorities (Roma) who may be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in their wage earning ability from the ethnic Romanian. The values can be interpreted
as percentage diﬀerences in the average wage earning skill of the group and the average wage-earning skills of
non-migrants.
The statistics obtained using diﬀerent methods and samples show only small variations. This reinforces the
idea that the features of selection that we found are quite robust and stable. First, the group of returnees
exhibits a positive average selection between 12 and 14%. This means that when compared to non-movers,
returnees have observable skills that allows them to earn domestic (monthly) wages higher by 12-14%. This is
as i g n i ﬁcant positive selection. To give some point of comparison, the Mincerian returns to schooling that we
estimated on the Romanian NDS data give a return around 0.06-0.07 per year of schooling. Hence, the average
diﬀerence in skills between non-migrants and returnees is equivalent to 2 years of schooling. This value is not
very sensitive to the corrections. Importantly, the number obtained when using the NDS employment data and
the number obtained when using employment from the Census are very similar, implying that as far as the
selection of returnees is concerned the two data produce compatible results.
Moving to the average selection of migrants to the US we also ﬁnd a large and economically signiﬁcant
positive selection ranging between 0.13 and 0.20. The only correction that makes some diﬀerence is the one for
participation which actually increases the selection, implying that the selection of individuals who migrate to
the US is even more positive that the selection of working individuals. This may be due to a lower participation
of more educated women to employment in the US if they move e.g. with their highly educated working
husband. Again, the pure skill selection among these migrants makes them equivalent to workers with 2-3
more years of schooling than the average non-migrant. Conﬁrming the ﬁrst impression from the education
and age data, the selection of migrants to Austria is essentially zero. The statistic is small implying at most
a 2-3% positive selection. Migrants to Austria are selected in a way that is not much correlated with their
wage-earning skills. Correcting for participation in Romania and using of the NDS rather than the Census data
to construct employment frequencies does not make much diﬀerence. Finally, the migrants to Spain exhibit
as i g n i ﬁcant negative selection. Conﬁrming the evidence from the education and age data, their average skill
selection ranges from -0.07 to -0.13. Using participation rates in Romania (column 3) reduces slightly the
negative selection, which implies that Romanian migrants to Spain also have lower employment participation
in higher skill groups. Migrants to Spain have skills equivalent to one to two fewer years of schooling relative
to Romanian non-migrants.
The average values of the selection variable conceal a whole distribution of skills for each group relative to
18non-migrants. Figures 3 and 4 show the comparison for the whole density distribution of non-migrants and other
groups. Figure 3 shows the comparison between non-migrants and returnees. We show the distribution of the
two groups by skill (logarithmic monthly wages). Two diﬀerences are clear even to a cursory visual inspection.
First, the density of returnees is consistently lower in the skill range corresponding to 400$ to 1000$ (monthly).
On the other hand, the density of returnees is larger for wages above 1000$ and has a particular peak of density
around 1600$. These workers are likely to be the college educated in some intermediate age groups. Overall we
can reject the hypothesis that the two distribution are equal by doing a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which rejects
equality at 0.1% signiﬁcance. Figure 4 shows the kernel density estimator for non-migrants and migrant in each
of the 3 destinations both using employment distribution by skill (Panel 1) and population distribution (Panel
2). The solid line represents non-migrants, the short dashed line is for migrants to Austria, the long dashed line
for migrants to Spain and the dotted line for migrants to the US. As expected, relative to the non-migrants, the
distribution of migrants to Spain shows a signiﬁcant density mass below the average skill level of non-migrants
(about 882 $) with a peak near 700 $. On the other hand the distribution of migrants to the US shows a
signiﬁcant mass of density above the average of non-migrants reaching high and very high wages (up to 1800 $).
The density of migrants to Austria is not too diﬀerent from that of non-migrants. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
of distributional equality between non-movers and migrants to Austria cannot reject the null at 5% conﬁdence.
All in all, average skill selection on observables ranges from -13% for migrants to Spain to +16% for migrants
to the US averaging around 0 for migrants to Austria. It is quite hard to say how much and in what direction
the unobserved selection would modify these numbers. In comparison Huertas-Moraga (2008) who estimates
negative selection for migrants from Mexico to the US reports that selection on unobservables is also negative
and about 30% of selection on observables. Kastner and Malamud (2010) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant selection
either on observables or on unobservables for the same Mexican migrants to the US. Clemens et al. (2008)
report a selection on unobservables for migrants from the Philippines equal to 8% and for South Africa they
report and even more positive selection on unobservables (around 20%). The few other estimates available are
for much poorer countries. In general, previous studies have either found an average selection on unobservables
of the same sign as the selection of observables but much smaller or no selection at all. With this caveat in
mind, we interpret the average observed selection as a correct measure of skill selection and proceed to identify
the migration and return premium.
4.3 Migration and Return Premium
The largest economic beneﬁt of international migration is in form of a "migration premium" for migrants.
Individuals with given skill characteristics increase substantially their wage and income by moving to countries
where their skills are paid much more. The average wage premium for migrants varies across countries of
destination, but so does the skill-proﬁle of migrants, which depends on how the labor market at the destination
price their skills. In general, for a given average wage diﬀerential, the inﬂuential Roy (1951) model (applied for
19instance in Borjas 1987 and Borjas and Bratsberg 1996) implies that countries with large skill compensation
(namely larger than in the country of origin) attract more skilled workers. Those countries typically exhibit
larger wage inequality driven by skill diﬀerences. To the contrary, given average wage diﬀerentials, countries
with low skill compensation (lower than in the country of origin) would attract instead less skilled workers. In
the ﬁrst case, this positive selection results from the migration premium increasing in skills while, in the second
case, negative selection results from the migration premium decreasing in skills.
A simple way of characterizing such migration premia across skills is to report the distribution of the log
wages earned by migrants abroad and those wages migrants would have received at home (imputed based
on their observable characteristics). Averaging those two distribution using the density of skills of migrants
and taking their diﬀerence would generate the average migration premium. The distributions of wages in the
country of emigration together with what those individuals would earn in Romania is shown in Figure 5. The
diﬀerence in the average skills between the two distributions represents the average migration premium and is
reported in 2003 US $ below each panel. Panel 1 reports the wage distribution for migrants in the US and
their counterfactual distribution had they worked in Romania. Panel 2 shows the same comparison for migrants
to Austria and Panel 3 for migrants to Spain. Two regularities are apparent. First, relative to their wage
distribution in Romania, migrants have a wider wage dispersion in the US, an intermediate one in Austria and
the smallest one in Spain, smaller even than in Romania. This is an indication that returns to skills are highest
in the US and lowest in Spain. Second, while signiﬁcant in each case, the average migration premium is much
more substantial for migrants to the US (990 $ per month) than for migrants to Spain (300 $ per month). This
is consistent with the large migration ﬂows to the US, and it partly compensates the large costs of migrating to
that country (farther and its more diﬀerent culture). More interestingly, however, is the fact that for migrants
to Spain the ﬁgure suggests that the largest beneﬁts would accrue to those who are in the long left tail of the
counter-factual Romanian wage distribution (hence the low skilled). To the contrary, for the migrants to the
US, the more likely to gain are those in the right tail of the wage distribution. A more systematic analysis of
premium and skills is needed here, although the simple wage distribution already indicates the main driver of
migration incentives between these countries.
5 M i g r a t i o na n dr e t u r nd r i v e nb ys k i l l - s p e c i ﬁcp r e m i a
In this section we analyze the migration and return premium in relation to skills and estimate the regressions
from section 3.4 to identify the correlation between migration and premia and to test the rationality of migration.
The upper part of Table 7 shows the correlation between premium and skills for, respectively, returnees (Column
1), migrants to the US (Column 2), to Austria (Column 3) and to Spain (Column 4). The ﬁrst three rows show
the correlation between the linear premium and the skills (ln) across skill groups (the units of observation are
the 320  cells). The regressions are estimated using least squares weighted by employment in the cell, in the
20ﬁrst row. In the second row we control for age and in the third row we add family-type ﬁxed eﬀects to check
whether within an age-family type group the premium for migration and return changes with skills (mainly
education) and whether the sign is as in the overall regression. The results are quite robust and conﬁrm the
simple evidence from the previous section. The premium for returnees and migrants to the US is very strongly
positively correlated with skills. The premium for migrants to Austria is neutral in the skill dimension; namely
it has no systematic correlation with the skill level of a group. There are certainly some groups for which the
migration premium is higher than others, but this diﬀerence is not systematically related to ln Finally, the
premium for migration to Spain is negatively related to skills: lower skills receive a larger wage-premium for
migration. As the dependent variables are in thousands of 2003 US $ and the explanatory variable is in ln,w e
can interpret the coeﬃcient as a semi elasticity. For instance, an increase in skills by 10% (equivalent to about
1.6 extra years of schooling, given a Mincerian return of 0.06 in Romania) would imply an increase in return
premium by 36 to 49 US $ for returnees, an increase by 114-128 $ of the premium for migrating to the US, no
change in the premium for migrating to Austria and a decrease of 44 to 75 $ in the premium for migrating to
Spain. Such eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other and precisely estimated.
The lower part of Table 7 characterizes the linear premia in relation to education levels. We regress the
premia on three dummies for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary schooling. The omitted dummy is "No degree"
and the estimated coeﬃcients are reported in rows 4 to 6. Interestingly, for the return premium, the largest
estimated dummy is for college educated, while the premium for primary and secondary educated is not very
large (relative to 0, the premium for those with no degree). Hence, simply isolating the education dimension,
most of the positive correlation of the return premium with skills derives from college educated. The case of
the premium for migrating to the US is diﬀerent, since all three education groups receive a signiﬁcant premium
relative to the group with no education. The premium for college educated is only marginally larger than the
premium for primary educated. For migration to Aust r i at h e r es e e m st ob ean e g a t i v ep r e m i u mt op r i m a r y
educated but a positive one for college educated. This non-monotonic eﬀect may be part of the reason that we
do not estimate a clear dependence of the premium on skills for migration to Austria. Finally for migration
to Spain the largest premium of all is for primary educated, and it is much lower for secondary and tertiary
educated, explaining the negative relation.
Table 8 shows the estimates of coeﬃcient  and  from equations 12 and 13 in its ﬁrst three rows. Do larger
wage premia bring higher frequencies of migrants and returnees? If the estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
positive, no matter what is the structure of the premium over skills, then migrants and returnees respond to
that premium by skill group proving the rationality of their behavior. The estimates clearly show that within
each skill group, the higher the premium to return and migration, the much higher will be also the relative
frequency of return and migration. In the third row we also control for a full set of age and family structure
dummies. These dummies are meant to capture diﬀerential migration and return costs for individuals of diﬀerent
age groups and diﬀerent family structure. Young, unmarried individuals with no children are the most mobile,
21hence one can expect that in these groups we observe the most migrants and returnees beyond the eﬀects of a
wage premium. This would be due to a systematic diﬀerence in costs rather than in the return to migration. The
inclusion of these proxies for migration costs only aﬀects the estimates of the coeﬃcient for Spain, which turns
insigniﬁcant. The other cases maintain a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between returns and migration
frequency. The estimated  and  coeﬃcients are always positive and signiﬁcant in 11 cases out of 12. Their
value ranges between 0.1 and 0.6 with most estimates between 0.2 and 0.4. Taking 0.25 as the median estimate,
this coeﬃcient implies that an increase in the migration premium for a skill group by 1,000 $ per month would
increase the frequency of migrants relative to non-migrants in that skill group by 25%. The stability of the
coeﬃcient across countries and even between migrants and returnees implies that we can think of a common
explanation for the skill selection of migrants and returnees, namely their response to the wage premium, i.e. to
economic incentives. The diﬀerent skill composition of migration to diﬀerent countries and the skills of returnees
can be explained simply by the common tendency to migrate where and to return when the premium is larger.
This common response to incentives is consistent with a positive skill-selection for returnees and migrants to the
US, with a negative selection for migrants to Spain, but also with the neutral selection of migrants to Austria.
These migrants too respond to wage premia, only those premia do not have a clear correlation with skills. The
last three rows of Table 8 report the correlation of return or migration frequencies with education dummies and
conﬁrm the described selection pattern.
6 Implications in a Model of Education, Migration and Return
There are two notable results in the previous empirical analysis. First, returnees to Romania are clearly positively
selected relative to non-migrants. It is harder to say whether they are positively selected from all migrants but
their positive selection is similar to migrants to the US. Second, returnees earn wages signiﬁcantly higher than
non-migrants and this diﬀerence increases with their skills. Interpreting the wage premium as a productivity
diﬀerence due to skills accumulated abroad, there are two potentially important eﬀects of migration and return
for the sending country. First, this process may increase the expected overall returns to skills, possibly inducing
the positive brain gain incentives emphasized by Docquier and Rapoport (2008) and oﬀsetting a negative brain
drain. Second, it may increase the productivity of returnees (who have learned new skills and enhanced their
human capital) with positive eﬀects for the domestic economy.
As the evidence points to a rational migration behavior, driven by migration and return premia, we use a
simple model (developed in Mayr and Peri 2009) to inquire more systematically the size of these two eﬀects
for Romania. Disciplining the model using the estimated parameters for Romania, we quantify the eﬀects
of migration in terms of years of schooling and average wages and simulate the eﬀects of relaxing migration
constraints. We will brieﬂy describe the intuition of the model below. The details of the model solution and of
the parametrization of the model can be found in Mayr and Peri (2009). The intuition of the model is simple
22and will guide us to identify the simulated eﬀects of freer migration on schooling and wages once we account
for return.
6.1 Key assumptions and Results of the model
We consider the Romanian economy as the home country and indicate it with . Romanians live two periods.
In the ﬁrst they pursue education and then decide whether to migrate and work. In the second period they
return or stay abroad. The wage of a Romanian with schooling  at home, in the ﬁrst period is:
ln(1
)=l n ( 
 )+ (14)
where ln(
 ) is the domestic wage of the worker with no schooling (). We assume that the agent’s
utility function is separable over time and it is logarithmic in each period’s income so that expression (14) also
represents the period utility from working and living at Home. If the individual migrates to a Foreign country
() his wage is ln(
 )+ At the same time we assume that there are costs of living abroad (material as
well as psychological) and that those costs are speciﬁc to the period of the individual’s life. We express these
costs in utility units and denote them by 1 and 2 where the subscripts refer to the period in which they are
incurred. Hence, the utility abroad (logarithmic wage net of costs of living abroad) for individual  when young
is:
ln(1
) − 1 =l n ( 
 )+ − 1 (15)
If the individual chooses to remain abroad in the second period, she will receive the following utility (logar-
ithmic wage net of costs of living abroad):
ln(2
) − 2 =l n ( 
 )+ − 2 (16)
As Romania is poorer than the average country of emigration, ln(
 )  ln(
 ). In the case of migration
to a country, such as the US, where the returns to schooling are higher, then   
Romanians who have been abroad for one period "enhanced" their human capital by learning new skills. If
they decide to return, this would increase their earnings per unit of initial human capital (as an augmentation of
their human capital). Moreover this premium, according to the evidence in the previous sections, is increasing
with skills. Hence, the (logarithmic) wage of a person who returns to the home country in the second period of
her life after having been abroad is:
ln(2
)=l n ( 
 )+ +  (17)
where 2
 indicates the wage in the second period of life (superscript) for individual  who has been abroad
23and returned. The parameter 0 is the extra return for human capital associated with the experience abroad.
Finally, the utility of workers who stayed at home is identical in the ﬁrst and second period and is given by the
following expression: ln(2
)=l n ( 
 )+.
The individual decisions are as follows. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period (youth) individual  chooses how
m u c hs c h o o l i n gt og e t , and simultaneously pays the cost, , for this education. We assume that this cost of
education is positively related to the amount of schooling achieved,  and inversely related to some individual
skills  so that  =
2

 and  is a common cost of getting education. In equilibrium the optimal amount
of schooling  is a monotonically increasing function of the skill  and schooling perfectly reveals individual
skills. Immediately after their schooling decision (still at the beginning of period 1) the individual chooses to
migrate or to stay. We treat migration as a lottery and the decision to participate in the lottery as voluntary.
Once an individual has entered the lottery she faces the same probability of migrating as any other participant
 ∈ [01] This lottery is our way of capturing migration openness. The probability  h a st od ow i t har a t i o n i n g
of migrants from the receiving country point of view. A policy of receiving countries that open the borders
to all immigrants would result into  =1  The regime before the collapse of the Soviet Block corresponded
essentially to  =0  At the beginning of the second period people who remained at Home continue to earn wage
. We assume that the cost of moving in the second period is too high to make it proﬁtable (or that the
receiving country has a policy which signiﬁcantly penalizes the immigration of older workers), while emigrants
living abroad can decide whether to stay in Foreign or to return.
The solution of the model7 identiﬁes the selection of migrants and returnees, in terms of their schooling 
(and the underlying skill parameter )This simple (log linear) structure of wages, utility and costs implies that
the model produces some "threshold" skill levels. The key parameter condition is as follows. If + ≥  
the return to migrating are higher for highly educated, hence migrants are relatively more educated. All workers
with skills (schooling level) above a threshold  will enter the migration lottery (and only a fraction  of them
will actually migrate). However the returns to return migrating are even higher for highly educated and hence
the most educated of all choose to migrate and return. In particular there will be a higher schooling threshold
 above which all individual, if migrated in the ﬁrst period would return in the second. Hence those with
intermediate schooling (between  and  ) choose to migrate and stay abroad (if they succeed to migrate),
least educated (below )s t a ya th o m e . T h em o s te d u c a t e d( a b o v e) migrate and return. The model
has one important implication. If the probability of migrating, , increases under positive skill selection more
intermediate and high skilled will migrate. However, two eﬀects may balance this brain drain. First, as education
is a choice, more individuals will choose higher education as the expected returns to schooling have increased.
Having higher probability to migrate (and return) increases the expected returns to education and induces more
individuals to get higher education8. Second, more migrants means more returnees and each one of them will
7For the details of solution see Mayr and Peri (2009).
8The response of education depends on the assumed costs of education and distribution of skills that we have set to match the
24beneﬁt from the extra-productivity (wage) eﬀect due to the accumulated skills aboard. These two positive
eﬀects on skills and wages can in part or completely oﬀset the negative eﬀect of a positive selection of migrants
that reduces the skill of those left in Romania.
The migration and return costs are set to match the share of returnees in total (always measured to be
around 0.4-0.5). The wages for no schooling ln(
 )ln(
 ) are set at the level observed from our Romania
data and the average of the three migration countries. The parameters  and  are the returns to schooling
estimated using a Mincerian equation for Romania (around 0.06) and for the average European country (around
0.08). The parameter  =0 025 is chosen to match the return premium obtained by college educated returnees
(around 0.28 over non-migrants). The other parameters of the model are kept as in Mayr and Peri (2009) to
match an average Eastern European Country.
6.2 Migration, Return and average wages in Romania
Table 9 shows the simulated eﬀects on years of schooling and wages (standardizing the wage with no migration
to 1) when we increase the probability of migration from 0 to 0.30 by increments of 0.05. To match the current
percentage of Romanians abroad as of 2003, the value of  would be near 0.10. For that value returnees equal
4.5% of the population in Romania and migrants (still abroad) equal 4.6% of Romanians. These numbers are
not too far from the 5% of returnees found in the NDS and the 3.2% of migrants in the Docquier and Marfouk
(2006) data. The ﬁrst result of the simulation, shown in the ﬁrst three rows of Table 9, is that relative to the
case of 0 migration the schooling of young and old people increases as the probability of migration increases.
In spite of having a loss of highly educated young workers due to positively selected migration the incentive
eﬀect on schooling more than balances this tendency. The eﬀect on average schooling of young individuals is
thus purely an incentive eﬀect. The eﬀect on old workers, to the contrary, combines also the positive selection
of returnees, so that as the most educated come back this further increases the average education of old relative
to the case with no migration. Overall, the eﬀect is that average schooling in the population is higher by half
a year due to international mobility relative to the case with no migration. With a probability of migration
equal to 0.20, which is double the current value, There would be an increase of average schooling of Romanian
population by one year relative to the case with no migration.
The wage eﬀects, reported in rows 4 to 10 are also interesting. Again the eﬀect on young is purely the
education incentive eﬀect. It amounts to a plus 2% (when  =0 10) relative to no migration and it could be
increased to +5% for  =0 20 The eﬀects on Old workers combines the incentive and the return premium and
generates an average increase by 9%, relative to no migration (for  =0 10). That gain increases to +22%
by doubling the migration ﬂows (loosening the policy to  =0 20). The rows showing the eﬀect on wages by
schooling level (wages are always relative to average wage with no migration) also show that all the gains from
initial distribution of Romanian population by schooling level (from the Barro-Lee 2000 data).
25migration and return accrue to the high schooling group which is the one most aﬀected by the positive incentives
and most rewarded by the return premium. The less educated are those who do not migrate in the model, hence
there are no eﬀects for them. The intermediate education is the group that migrates but does not return, hence
the return premium has no incentive eﬀect on them nor has a direct eﬀect in raising wages. The wage of highly
educated, however, rises by 44% for young individuals (due to their much larger education) and by 58% for old
individuals, due to higher schooling and the return premium.
If we were to eliminate the schooling incentive eﬀect from the simulation (table available upon request) we
would observe a negative schooling and wage eﬀect of migration on the young generation (due to brain drain)
but still a positive schooling and wage eﬀect on the old generation (brain return and return premium). The two
eﬀects in our model would still give a small positive average wage eﬀect.
6.3 Some Policy Experiments
The model also allows us to change, by some small amount, the policy variables and analyze what would
happen to migration, return and wages in Romania9. For instance a decrease of the variable 1,t h ec o s to f
residing abroad, possibly associated with better communication, more homogeneous institutions, more integrated
markets implies higher migration, lower percentage of returnees and thus a stronger incentive-eﬀect of migration
increasing the schooling level. And just the opposite eﬀects would occur if costs increased. For an increase of
these migration costs by 20% average wages and average years of schooling in Romania would decrease by 1%.
More interestingly, an increase in the reward to highly educated in the receiving countries, such as a ﬁscal
incentive for high earner in these countries, or a larger decrease in tax rates for highly educated, would generate
two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, as potential emigrants will have larger expected returns to skills in the
receiving country, this will produce a stronger education incentive eﬀect in the sending country and will increase
average schooling of young. On the other hand, fewer migrants would return, and this would decrease schooling
of the old generation in Romania. For a ﬁscal incentive that only increases returns to schooling from 8% to 8.3%
in the receiving country, the two eﬀects will produce a 2% wage and schooling increase in Romania all due to
higher education of young. Finally, the country of origin may introduce some ﬁscal incentive for highly skilled
returnees, corresponding to an increase in the parameter  A ﬁscal incentive that increase by 30% the premium
of returnees, proportionally to their schooling, would double the percentage of returnees (to almost 80% of
total migrants). Moreover it would increase the wages of highly educated in Romania and, more importantly,
the share of people getting high education. This produces an increase in education and wages by 1-2%. The
increase in the schooling-return premium is as s o c i a t e db o t hw i t has t r o n g e ri n c e n t i v ee ﬀect that pushes young
generations to higher educational achievements, so that more individuals get higher educations, and to a steeper
wage proﬁle for highly educated returnees. Certainly, both are a boon for schooling and productivity in the




Three interesting implications emerge from our ﬁndings with potentially relevant and direct policy implications.
The ﬁrst is that migrants and returnees are strongly aﬀected by wage incentives. Countries with a wage structure
strongly increasing in skills attract thus the most highly educated immigrants inducing the greatest beneﬁts to
their income and productivity. The second is that migrants acquire valuable skills while aboard and receive
signiﬁcant premia upon return (between 12 and 14% of their wage) relative to non movers. Temporary migration
is a reasonable strategy to increase one’s lifetime income. Third, for the sending country, under these conditions
of selection and return, the average productivity and average human capital, is enhanced when there is a larger
share of migrant workers.
One interesting implication of these ﬁndings is that in a migration relationship, such as the one described
for Romania and the US, it would be beneﬁcial for both countries and for the migrants to allow for temporary
working or studying and working visa programs. The strong incentives of the highly educated to migrate and the
large premia they would earn upon return make this option very attractive. On the other hand in a migration
relationship, such as the one between Romania and Spain, the beneﬁts for both countries may be smaller. Spain
receives the less educated workers, still economically useful but less likely to increase productivity and human
capital in Spain. Moreover these workers will have less scope for learning and productive increases after return.
A second possibility open to the government of Romania is to provide ﬁscal incentive, progressive with skills,
for people who end their temporary migration period and return10. Decreasing the marginal tax proportionally
with schooling is like increasing the value of  the returns to schooling for people who come back. As shown
above, this will increase the incentives of the highly educated to return.
Interesting questions that we are not able to answer w i t ht h e s ed a t ai sw h e t h e rt h et y p eo fs e l e c t i o no f
returnees will remain the same also for those people who went back to Eastern Europe as a consequence of the
great recession (2007-2009) in Western Europe. While the recession in western Europe can be a very important
opportunity for Romania and other Eastern European countries to regain some of their expatriates and their
enhanced human capital, it is possible that the type of people going back in periods of recession is diﬀerent
from those who returned in periods of normal economic growth. Given the overall positive selection of migrants
documented in many studies (e.g. Docquier et al 2010), however, it is likely that returnees, even in recessions,
are more educated than non-migrants11.
Finally the reduction of migration costs (e.g. bureaucratic simpliﬁcation, skill transferability) can be another
lever that European countries may use to increase the beneﬁcial impact of temporary migration. Allowing lower
10Such incentive schemes were in fact on the political agenda of the Romanian government but never implemented and abandoned
in the context of economic recession.
11Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the overall eﬀect of the economic downturn on return migration to Eastern Europe in
general and to Romania in particular was rather small.
27costs and higher probability of migration and introducing more programs for temporary migration between
countries should increase ﬂows. Countries with the right reward structure (compensating highly educated and
high quality workers) will attract the best combination of them and the workers themselves will increase their
skills and their productivity back home. This is beneﬁcial to the sending countries, to the individuals and to
the receiving countries. The losers are countries that are not competitive in attracting the highly educated.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we measure empirically the magnitude and the selection of migrants and returnees in the case of
Romania. After 1990 Romania has experienced large emigration ﬂows followed by signiﬁcant rates of return
migration. In terms of countries of destination, magnitude and composition of ﬂows, this pattern of migration
is representative for Eastern Europe. Our goal was to characterize the selection of migrants and returnees and
to test whether their motivations to migrate and return were consistent with a utility maximizing framework.
We used this to assess the eﬀects of migration and return on the level of skills and wages in Romania, allowing
also for a education-incentive eﬀect driven by higher expected returns to schooling. Our ﬁndings emphasize that
return migration is an important phenomenon: about half of the people who migrate do return. Returnees are
strongly positively selected, relative to non-migrants, while the selection of migrants depends on the country
of destination. Returnees are selected in a similar way as migrants to the countries with highest skill premium
(like e.g. the US). Both types of selection (either to migrate or to migrate and return) are consistent with the
idea that workers move in accordance to the wage premium they receive. Decisions to return may therefore be
part of an optimal strategy to maximize lifetime income. Following the idea that people migrate and return
to maximize their utility and that selection at each stage is driven by relative compensation to skills we also
perform a simple simulation (based on Peri and Mayr 2009) which suggests that increasing freedom of migration
would increase average wage and schooling of the Romanian population through incentives to get educated and
the wage-productivity premium to returnees. The overall eﬀects of migration and return on skill and wages of
Romanian are positive.
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Stock of Emigrants to OECD countries as ratio of the population in the home country 
 
Country of origin   1990   2000 
Albania 0.162  0.190 
Bulgaria 0.060  0.080 
Croatia 0.123  0.140 
Czech Republic  0.021  0.027 
Estonia 0.028  0.054 
Hungary 0.042  0.041 
Latvia 0.020  0.033 
Lithuania 0.057  0.054 
Macedonia 0.138  0.169 
Poland 0.041  0.044 
Romania 0.020  0.031 
Russia 0.003  0.006 
Serbia and Montenegro  0.069  0.091 
Slovenia 0.044  0.072 
 
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2006). The data are obtained by national 
censuses of the receiving country and include all OECD countries as receiving. 
The data are relative to the census year of the receiving countries and those are 











Imputed return relative to gross migration flows (any OECD destination), 1990-2000;  
Selected Eastern European source countries 





Albania  20476 34207  0.60 
Bulgaria  24353 42109  0.58 
Czechoslovakia  24230 18697.5  1.30 
Estonia  5859 12099  0.48 
Hungary  54450 40535  1.34 
Lithuania  2824 12010  0.24 
Latvia  3053 9713.5  0.31 
Poland  282984 306841.5  0.92 
Romania  54197 132311.5  0.41 
 
Note: The data are obtained by authors’ calculations (as described in the text) using 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and the UN (2009) datasets. The return flows are imputed 
assuming that all re-migration is return migration. 
 
Table 3 
Imputed return relative to gross emigration flows from Eastern Europe, 1990-2000;  
Selected OECD destination countries 
 
Destination Return  Flows 
(imputed) 
Gross flows  Return/Gross 
Australia 28933 15012 1.93 
Austria 26385 110096 0.24 
Belgium 11219 13151 0.85 
Canada 101096 108537 0.93 
Finland 1007 9265 0.11 
France 49413 19982 2.47 
Norway 4247 6649 0.64 
Sweden 19483 22684 0.86 
USA 230643 303148 0.76 
 
Note: The data are obtained by authors calculations (as described in the text) using 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and the UN (2009) datasets. The return flows are imputed 
assuming that all re-migration is return migration. 34 
 
Table 4 








returnee as ratio 
of population 
living abroad 
(OECD) as ratio 
of population 
all 0.049  0.032 
education groups 
tertiary 0.058  0.126 
secondary 0.056 0.126 
primary completed  0.034  0.016 
No degree completed  0.015  0.039 
 











Note: Authors’ calculations on Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data. The sum of 
Romanian migrants to OECD countries is standardized to 1. The table reports the 
fraction of such sum in each of the top 6 countries of destination. 
 
 
Country of Destination  
Migrants as share of 









































Returnees  +0.14 +0.12  +0.13  +0.13  +0.14 
Migrants to US  +0.16 +0.13  +0.20  +0.14  +0.15 
Migrants to Austria  0.03 0.01 +0.04  +0.03  0.02 
Migrants to Spain  -0.11 -0.13  -0.07  -0.13  -0.10 
 
 
Note: The calculation of Average selection on Observable Skills follows the formulas in section 3.2 of the text. Column 
(1) uses the employment data by skill cell from the Romanian Census 2002, Column (2) uses the employment data from 
the National Demographic survey 2003, Column (3) corrects for participation in Romania; Column (4) includes only male 





 Migration- and Return- Premium and their correlation with wage-earning skills 
Linear monthly Wage premium  
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Reference Group  












































Note: The unit of observation is an education-age-gender-family status cell. There are 320 cells. The dependent 
variable is the difference between the wage of a returnee (migrant) and that of a non-mover in the same skill cell 
expressed in thousands of 2003 $. Method of estimates is weighted LS, with weights equal to the non-migrant 
population in the cell. 37 
 
Table 8 
 Correlation between Migration- and Return- frequencies and migration and return premium  
Linear monthly Wage premium  










































Premium   Controlling 















































Does it support 
the selection by 
premium theory? 
  Yes  Yes  Yes, in part  Yes in part 
Note: The unit of observation is an education-age-gender-family status cell. There are 320 cells. The 
explanatory variable is the difference between the wage of a returnee (migrant) and that of a non-mover in the 
same skill cell expressed in thousands of 2003 $. Method of estimates is weighted LS, with weights equal to the 
non-migrant population in the cell unless otherwise noted. 38 
 
Table 9 
Simulated effects of increasing freedom of migration, p, in Romania on schooling and wages 
Parameter as in Romania 2003; Migration and return 
 
p 
0  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20 0.25 0.30 
Years of Schooling 
Average Schooling of young  12  12.16  12.33  12.49  12.64  12.78  12.91 
Average schooling of  old  12  12.32  12.66  13.01  13.37  13.75  14.15 
Average schooling, overall  12  12.24  12.50  12.76  13.03  13.30  13.59 
Wages (standardized to 1 with no migration) 
Average wages, young  1  1.01  1.02  1.04  1.05  1.07  1.08 
Average wages, old  1  1.04  1.09  1.15  1.22  1.29  1.36 
Average wages, overall  1  1.03  1.06  1.10  1.14  1.18  1.23 
Average wage  No primary  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47 
Average wage Primary-
Secondary 
0.73 0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73 0.73 0.73 
Average  wage  tertiary-young  1.41 1.43  1.45  1.48  1.50 1.52 1.55 
Average  wage  tertiary-old  1.41 1.48  1.56  1.64  1.73 1.82 1.92 
Migration Rates 
Share of emigrants  0  0.045  0.091  0.137  0.183  0.230  0.276 
Share of returnees among 
emigrants 
  0.471  0.482  0.492  0.502 0.512 0.521 
Note:  We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration. The 
simulations follow Mayr and Peri (2009). 39 
 
Figure 1: Selection over Education  
Panel 1: Non Migrants and Returnees  (Romania Census)    Panel 2: Non Migrants and Migrants to USA (US Census) 
               
 
Panel 3: Non Migrants and Migrants to Austria  (Austria census)   Panel 4: Non Migrants and Migrants to Spain (Spanish Census) 
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Less Primary Primary Secondary University
Education Groups
 Non Migrants
 Migrants to Spain40 
 
 
Figure 2: Selection over Age 
Panel 1: Non Migrants and Returnees(Romania Census)      Panel 2: Non Migrants and Migrants to USA (US census) 
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Kernel density of non migrants and returnees over skill, Census 2002 
Monthly wages, in 2003 US $ 
 
Note: The function represents the density of each population over the wage-earning skill, ln(wage), distribution estimated using a Gaussian 


























Kernel density of migrants and returnees over skill, Census 2002 
Monthly wages, in 2003 US $ 
Panel 1: Based on employment            Panel 2: Based on Population 
 
 
Note:  The function represents the density of each population over the wage-earning skill, ln(wage), distribution 




















400$ 600$ 1100$ 1810$ 2980$
ln(Monthyl Wage)
 Non Migrants  Migrants to USA
















400$ 600$ 1100$ 1810$ 2980$
ln(Monthly Wages)
 Non Migrants  Migrants to USA
 Migrants to Austria  Migrants to Spain43 
 
 
Figure 5: Migration premium: Wages in the Destination country and in Romania 
Migrants  to  US        Migrants  to  Austria 
        
Average premium = 112% of Romanian wage =990 $ per month    Average premium=100% of Romanian wage =882 $ per month 
Migrants to Spain 
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 Migrants to Spain at Romanian wages